PERCEPTION OF KOREAN OPINIONS: A STUDY OF U.S. ARMY OFFICERS' EXPERTISE

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ABSTRACT

This study was designed to identify which U.S. Army officers would be best able to estimate the views of a foreign population. One hundred and sixty-one U.S. Army officers stationed in Korea were studied. Statistical analysis showed that expertise varied with time spent in Korea, interaction with certain Koreans, openmindedness, satisfaction with the assignment to Korea, and education.

This study may be useful in suggesting factors to be considered in selecting officers for assignments in psychological operations, civil affairs, intelligence and, in general, officers from whom to solicit estimates of the views of a foreign population.

FOREWORD

Many military plans and decisions today require knowledge of current views, attitudes, or values of a foreign population about which little information is readily available. A method commonly used for rapidly obtaining such data is to consult civilian or military personnel considered to be experts on an area. The Army, for example, has sought to acquire accurate knowledge of foreign groups by debriefing personnel who were stationed overseas.

Use of expert consultants leads to the practical problem of selecting from among available persons those who are most expert and most likely to give accurate information. The present study, exploratory in nature and not intended as a comprehensive answer, is an attempt to solve the problem of how to select experts. An objective criterion was developed to measure systematically expertise.

It is hoped that this study will be useful in identifying factors to be considered in selecting officers for psychological operations, civil affairs, intelligence, and advisory assignments and, more generally, in selecting individuals to estimate the views of a foreign population.

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The original technical research plan of the study was prepared by Dr. Richard Panman who prepared the instruments and supervised the coding of the responses onto numerical data sheets before he left CRESS. The present author reviewed the literature, statistically analyzed all data, interpreted the findings, and wrote the report.

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SUMMARY

Military planners and decisionmakers often are confronted with a requirement to obtain accurate and unbiased information on the attitudes of a foreign population. In contemporary warfare and in internal defense and development, the attitudes of the local population have been recognized as being an important factor, not to be overlooked by the military planners and operators. In cases where there is no written up-to-date information, the Army frequently has used officers stationed overseas as experts or has debriefed military personnel who returned from a mission in a foreign locale. Who are the best experts? What are their characteristics. By what yardstick can their competence be measured?

GENERAL RESEARCH APPROACH

The study was designed to identify the U. S. Army officers who would be best able to estimate views of a foreign population. it aims to shed light on certain background characteristics of Army officers, such as the length and the nature of their in-country experience, that are related to their ability to estimate attitudes of a foreign population. To identify these characteristics, it first was necessary to establish a criterion of expertise. In general, it is difficult to find good criteria for expertise on the attitudes of a population in an unfamiliar country. The criterion used in this study was the responses to an opinion survey of 500 Koreans. By comparing the Korean opinion data with the officers' estimates of the opinions, the expertise of officers could be expressed in quantitative terms, and its significance could be tested statistically. (Statistical tests of significance are used to determine the probability of whether findings are due to mere chance and thus how much confidence can be placed in them.)

The background characteristics hypothesized to be related to the ability to estimate the Korean views accurately included length of time in Korea, education, age, marital status, interaction with different types of Koreans, "dogmatism," and satisfaction with the assignment to Korea.

One hundred and sixty-one U. S. Army officers stationed in Korea answered a set of questionnaires: a biographic data form, a questionnaire on Korean opinions, and a "dogmatism" scale. The questionnaires were designed to reveal officers' perception of Korean opinions, their military and biographical backgrounds, their own attitudes, and their social interactions with Koreans. Then, their perception would be compared with their background characteristics and interaction. The officers ranged from warrant officers and second lieutenants to lieutenant colonels, and were assigned to three major units in the Seoul-Inchon area in May-June 1966. Korean attitudes had been determined by a public opinion survey in Seoul. The survey of 500 Koreans was used as a standard to see which U. S. Army officers were the most "expert" in estimating the Korean attitudes.

FINDINGS

Length of time in the country. One of the findings of the study was that the group of officers who had stayed longer in Korea (average 11 months) were more accurate than the short-staying group (average 2.3 months). Length of time in Korea was not the only significant factor. The officers' "expertise" grew as their contact with certain groups of Korean civilians increased.

Interaction with Korean nationals. The single most significant predictor of ability to estimate Korean opinions was frequent interaction with Korean white-collar workers and professionals. These groups were made up largely of educated and articulate English-speaking Koreans employed by the U.S. Army. They included translators, bookkeepers, and other official personnel. Officers who interacted more with Korean shopkeepers and peddlers off U.S. Army bases tended to be more accurate in estimating opinions. Officers who had more frequent contact with students tended to overestimate pro-U.S. responses. A number of these contacts occurred when officers taught English or advised Korean students who may have been pro-American in their outlook. On the other hand, hardly any relation was found between expertise and interaction with Korean military personnel and government officials.

Ed . An interesting finding referred to the relation between education level of U.S.
office. xpertise." The best performance tended to be given by officers with advanced
degree. t 's, M.D.'s, LL.B.'s, etc.) but, on the average, respondents who had only a
B.A. or college degree tended to be less accurate than officers without any degree. This result may indicate that the nongraduate officers make up in experience and "maturity" what they lack in formal education. Compared to the whole sample, the average nongraduate had been more years in the service and more months in Korea, and he was senior in terms of rank and age.

Satisfaction with assignment to Korea. Another significant indicator of "expertise" was that officers who were "extremely satisfied" with their tour of duty in Korea estimated Korean views more accurately than less satisfied officers.

"Dogmatism." Officers who were relatively more "dogmatic" (as determined by Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale) were less accurate and tended to overestimate Korean anti-American opinions.

Aside from expertise, the study found significant relationships among some of the officers' characteristics. Officers who were more satisfied with their assignment to Korea tended to be less "dogmatic," to have spent more time in Korea, and to interact more frequently with Korean students. Closer general interaction with Koreans was found among officers who possessed advanced educational degrees and who were in Korea longer.

CONCLUSIONS

In many military assignments overseas, the ability to have a reasonably accurate understanding of a foreign population's views is important. The research reported here sought to identify the officers who possess this ability to a relatively high degree.

The results of the study indicate some significant differences among officers' ability to perceive Korean opinions. The study relates this ability to the officers' military and general backgrounds, their attitudes, and their interactions with Koreans. Specifically, officers found

to be most expert on Korean opinions had spent more time in Korea, had interacted more with some types of Korean civilians, were less "dogmatic" and were most satisfied with being assigned to Korea. The best experts tended to be officers who held postgraduate degrees, but noncollege graduates performed better than officers who held only bachelor's degrees. This was explained to mean that an officer's experience and maturity can make up for lack of formal education.

This report may be useful in suggesting factors to be considered in selecting officers for assignments in psychological operations, civil affairs, intelligence and, in general, officers from whom to solicit estimates of the views of a foreign population.

SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO READ THIS REPORT

Part I is written for the general reader who will find in Chapter 1 a statement of the study's purpose and a discussion of its background, hypotheses, and the general research approach. Chapter 2 presents a nontechnical discussion of the results. Readers interested in the more technical aspects of the study are referred to Part II. Chapter 3 spells out technical aspects of the methods used. Chapter 4 reports the statistical details of the results. The questionnaires used are presented in the Appendix.

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PART I

GENERAL RESEARCH REPORT

CHAPTER 1
GENERAL RESEARCH APPROACH

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

United States military planners and decisionmakers at home and commanders on overseas assignments often are confronted with a requirement to obtain accurate and unbiased information on a foreign country or population. In cases where no written up-to-date information on certain aspects of a foreign area exists, the Army has frequently resorted to consultation with experts or to the debriefing of military personnel recently returned from a mission in a foreign locale.

An expert is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary as "one who has acquired special skill in or knowledge of a particular subject through professional training or practical experience." In certain fields, like geology or agriculture, there are more or less generally accepted standards of expertise or specialized competence.[1] It is much harder, however, to determine expertise in knowledge of the psychological characteristics and attitudes of a foreign population. Generally, no quantitative objective data exist; moreover, psychological-social data differ from other data in that they often depend on impressionistic, subjective judgments. Nevertheless, military planners and commanders often have to act on the best available information concerning a foreign population. Frequently, no up-to-date reports are available, and thus the military have to identify and interview individuals who possess expert knowledge of a foreign population. The question then is, which persons can provide the best information? Must one follow a course of trial and error by asking any persons who happen to have been in a foreign country and to be available at the moment? Or is it possible to identify personal qualities and background characteristics of individuals who are able to estimate foreign views most accurately?

It is generally assumed that living in a foreign country for a time leads to some more or less accurate knowledge about the local population and its attitudes. This raises the problem of who, among a number of persons who have lived in an overseas locale, would be most expert on the local people's views. This problem becomes particularly pressing when different "experts" make contradictory statements.[2] Whose judgment should be accepted? Whose advice should be followed?

This study seeks to shed some light on the characteristics of Army officers that are related to their expertise in estimating attitudes of a foreign population. To determine these characteristics, it first is necessary to establish a criterion or standard of expertise.[3] It is difficult to find any good criterion for expertise on the attitudes of a population in an unfamiliar country. For this study, the criterion used was Korean responses to an opinion survey. The objectively collected data of a public opinion poll conducted for the U.S. Information Agency were used as the standard to gauge "expertise." The use of survey data seemed to be more practical and to permit coverage of more Koreans representing a larger segment of the population than could be covered by the more time-consuming in-depth approach of the anthropologist.[4]

Expertise thus was to be measured by the officers' ability to estimate Korean responses to public opinion survey questions. By comparing the criterion, i.e., the actual Korean opinion data, with the officers' estimates of these data, the amount of expertise of officers could be expressed in quantitative terms, and its significance could be tested statistically. (Statistical tests of significance are used to determine the probability of whether findings are due to mere chance and thus how much confidence can be placed in them.)

HYPOTHESES

The first step was to determine what background characteristics of the U.S. Army officers one would expect or hypothesize to be related to the ability to assess Korean views accurately. A review of relevant scientific literature suggests a number of hypotheses that could be tested in this study.

First, it was hypothesized that the ability to assess Korean views accurately would be positively related to the amount of relevant experience such as the length of time in the country. Coelho reports his research on students from India who studied in the United States.[5] He found that the Indians' knowledge of their host country increased in detail, variety, and scope over a period of 36 months. He reports that during that period, students developed international perspectives that superseded narrowly provincial or "grossly nationalistic points of view." The present study includes a biographical inventory in which the officers were asked to give information about such facts as the number of months they had stayed in Korea, their education, knowledge of the language, and their knowledge of the country and people prior to the assignment.

Another hypothesis was that expertise would increase with education, and social science and humanities majors would be better estimators than officers who had majored in other fields. Thus, the inventory included questions on highest degree and major field of study.

Next, it was expected that certain biographic characteristics like age and marital status would be correlated with the ability to estimate Korean opinions. Thus, the biographical information form included questions on the officer's age and marital status. A corollary hypothesis was that unmarried officers would know more about Korean popular views because they would associate more with Korean civilians, particularly with unmarried girls.

Anita Mishler in her review of "Personal Contact in International Exchanges"[6] focused on factors of a traveler's mentality which precede a trip overseas. She states that these factors can determine opportunities to establish contacts and the nature of these contacts.[7] It was thus hypothesized that frequency of interaction with certain types of Korean nationals would be positively correlated with the ability to estimate Korean attitudes. The relevance of certain types of interaction was stressed by Ralph White,[8] who pointed out that Americans tend to have contacts with precisely those foreign nationals most likely to support a pro-American government. Tarr has discussed the isolation of the American military overseas.

> American bases abroad stand as rather lonely islands of America in which
> their inhabitants seek emotional reinforcement by emphasizing things Ameri-
> can. With respect to the latter, the military helps them do it by bringing
> much of America to the base—from schools, television programs, and beer to
> American merchandise.[9]

In short, they try to lead the same kind of life they led in the United States, which they remember as the "Land of the Big PX."[10]

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> Continuous fraternization with local inhabitants is not common. Where
> Americans go off the post, there often exists a string of bars and clubs
> established for the purpose of entertaining the "GI's" similar to those that
> surround bases in the United States. . . . This is not to say that there is
> virtually no contact between American military personnel and citizens of
> the host countries. Community relations are a matter of both pride and
> concern in most areas. The military encourages good relations. Special
> welfare and community services, health programs, and emergency relief
> are often provided either by voluntary services and money donated by the
> military personnel or, sometimes, by officially sanctioned activities by the
> armed services themselves. Yet it is not unfair to conclude that private,
> more natural contact with local people is infrequent. In some cases the
> language barrier is difficult to surmount, yet even in England the [American]
> servicemen remain somewhat isolated from the local community. [11]

The biographic inventory therefore included items on the frequency of contact with various
types of Koreans.

The perception of foreign nationals has been shown to be affected strongly by stereotypes,
as was indicated, for example, by Buchanan and Cantril. [12] Stereotypes serve the psychological
need for order by providing concise generalizations for such complex phenomena as the char-
acter of the people who make up a nation. National stereotypes develop gradually in child-
hood, as was shown by Lambert and Klineberg. [13] Stereotypes simplify reality and overem-
phasize limited aspects of a group. Much research has been conducted on the relationship of
attitudes and stereotypes to personality characteristics of the perceiver. Of special fruitful-
ness has been the work on the "authoritarian personality." [14] This term refers to a cluster of
traits found in some persons and includes conformity, dependence on others' authority, rigid
thinking, and ethnocentrism. In subsequent work, Rokeach developed the more general con-
cept of "dogmatism" or "closedmindedness," defined as "adherence to a relatively closed sys-
tem of beliefs about reality that is organized around a set of central beliefs about absolute
authority." [15] The dogmatic person exhibits a strong resistance to evidence that does not fit
into his belief system. It should be noted that dogmatism is independent of political liberalism
and conservatism; there are dogmatic conservatives as well as dogmatic liberals.

In the present study it was hypothesized that the ability to estimate foreign views would be
related to the personality characteristics of the perceiver as well as to his experience with
and knowledge of the culture and its people. More specifically, it was expected that the more
dogmatic respondents, i.e., those with relatively closed minds, would be less accurate in es-
timating Korean opinions. The reasoning was that the more closedminded respondents would
be less likely to perceive foreign views that did not readily fit into their relatively closed
belief systems. A 40-item Dogmatism Scale designed by Rokeach was included in the present
study's questionnaires.

It has been reported that American reactions to overseas assignment vary enormously.
Three typical reactions have been identified. Some persons reject the local culture and people.
Their distrust or hostility may reflect their stereotypes. Individuals at the other extreme "go
native." The third reaction is that of Americans who try to appreciate local customs and learn
some of the language. Although they retain their cultural identity, they maintain good relation-
ships with the local population. [16] Of course, the above three groups are ideal types; in reality
most persons fall somewhere between the three types. In an article on satisfaction with over-
seas assignments Sanders reports that one study found that the more satisfied professionals
spent more time in social interactions with host nationals. [17] In the present study, it was

hypothesized that the officers most satisfied with their Korean assignments would be most accurate in estimating Korean views. A question on satisfaction with their assignment was included in the biographic data form given to the officers.

INSTRUMENTS*

Three instruments were used in the study.

1. Biographic data form. Its purpose was to obtain information on the officers' biographical background, experiences in Korea, and reactions to their assignment.

2. Korean opinion questionnaire. This instrument was labeled the "Social Perception Questionnaire." It contained 23 questions given to 500 Koreans in a public opinion survey. The U.S. Army officers were asked to estimate how the Koreans answered the 23 questions.

3. Dogmatism scale. This form was labeled the "Social Attitudes Scale." It consisted of 40 brief statements, the responses to which measure dogmatism or closedmindedness.

SAMPLE

The sample consisted of 161 U.S. Army officers stationed in Korea, ranging in rank from warrant officers and second lieutenants to lieutenant colonels.

ANALYSIS

The data collected were punched into IBM cards and computer-analyzed. Two measures of the officers' ability to estimate Korean views were developed: an "accuracy score" and a "directionality score." The accuracy score measures how accurately the officers estimated Korean views. The accuracy score deals with the closeness of an officer's estimates to the Korean data regardless of whether he over- or underestimated Korean responses. The directionality score, on the other hand, takes into account the direction of a respondent's inaccuracy, that is, whether he tends to over- or underestimate the pro-American character of the responses of the Korean sample.

A number of statistical tests were conducted to determine which background characteristics were significantly related to the officers' expertise. Included in these characteristics were certain biographical factors, contacts with various types of Koreans, and some attitudes of the officers.

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* These instruments were prepared and labeled prior to the present author's work on the study.

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NOTES

[1] For example, in a recent study by H. H. Hyman, G. N. Levine, and C. R. Wright, "Studying Expert Informants by Survey Methods: A Cross-National Inquiry," Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 1967, pp. 9-26, experts on the introduction of planned change in developing countries were chosen by requiring each one to satisfy a set of strict criteria. These included work in a professional capacity for at least nine months, in direct contact with the local population, in the course of a planned program involving the population's voluntary participation, in one of four spheres of social change. As it turned out, some experts had much better credentials: 60% held graduate degrees, 28% had worked on four or more development projects within the last ten years, 75% had first-hand experience in using at least three established techniques for inducing social change, and 32% had worked in two or more major regions of the world. Thus the researchers could select a subgroup of "more authoritative" informants who were used as a standard to test the quality of the reports of the whole group.

[2] See, for instance, John W. Lewis in a review of seven books on Communist China, "The Study of Chinese Political Culture," World Politics, XVIII (1966), pp. 503-524.

[3] A number of studies on the evaluation and utilization of expert opinions have been conducted at The RAND Corporation. Some of these studies use as criteria facts of the type found in the World Almanac. See, for instance, the following: Bernice Brown and Olaf Helmer, Improving the Reliability of Estimates Obtained From a Consensus of Experts, P-2986 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, September 1964); T. J. Gordon and Olaf Helmer, Report on a Long-Range Forecasting Study, P-2982 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, September 1964); Norman Kalkey and Olaf Helmer, An Experimental Application of the DELPHI Method to the Use of Experts, RM-27-PR (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, July 1962); Olaf Helmer, Social Technology, P-3063 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, February 1965); Olaf Helmer, The Systematic Use of Expert Judgement in Operations Research, P-2795 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, September 1963); Olaf Helmer and Nicholas Rescher, "On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences," Management Science, VI (1960), pp. 25-52.

[4] See H. H. Hyman, "Studying Expert Informants," pp. 12-13.

[5] G. V. Coelho, Changing Images of America (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1959).

[6] In H. C. Kelman, International Behavior (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 550-561.

[7] Ibid., p. 552.

[8] R. K. White, "Misperception and the Vietnam War," Journal of Social Issues, XXII, No. 3 (1966), p. 98.

[9] D. W. Tarr, "The Military Abroad," in "Americans Abroad," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLXVIII (1966), p. 38. See also Newsweek, January 17, 1966, p. 47.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., p. 39.

[12] William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, How Nations See Each Other (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1953).

[13] W. E. Lambert and Otto Klineberg, Children's Views of Foreign Peoples (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967).

[14] T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950).

[15] Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

[16] Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Working Abroad: A Discussion of Psychological Attitudes and Adaptation in New Situations, Report No. 41 (New York: G.A.P., 1958), p. 504.

[17] I. T. Sanders, "American Professionals Overseas," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XXII, No. 10 (December 1966), pp. 40-45.

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CHAPTER 2

FINDINGS

MEASURES OF EXPERTISE IN ABILITY TO ESTIMATE KOREAN OPINIONS

As has been indicated, two measures were developed to indicate the U.S. Army officers' expertise: the accuracy score and the directionality score. Accuracy scores measured how closely the officers could estimate Korean views. The accuracy score of a perfect estimate would be zero, because there would be no difference between the original Korean views and the officers' estimates. The higher the score, the greater the difference between the Korean data and an officer's estimates. The most inaccurate score possible would be 18.1. The mean (average) of all officers' accuracy scores was 4.88. Accuracy scores of individual officers ranged from 3.30 to 7.50.* Statistically, the results suggest that the task of estimating Korean opinion data was a difficult one for the officer group. Still, there were significant differences among the officers in ability to estimate attitudes of a foreign population, depending on background characteristics.

Directionality scores measured the direction of a respondent's inaccuracy, indicating whether he tended to over- or underestimate pro-American (or anti-Communist) opinions of the Koreans. The mean (average) of all respondents' directionality scores was .02; this indicates that the officers' group as a whole was not biased in one direction—that over- and underestimates nearly balanced. A negative (-) score indicates underestimation of pro-American views; a positive (+) score means overestimation of Korean pro-U.S. views. Individual officers' directionality scores ranged from -3.28 to +4.98.†

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* The most accurate score was that of a major with a B.A. in political science. He "rarely or never" had contact with close personal Korean friends, but he had been in Korea twelve months, had visited Korea previously on several TDY trips, and, as Allied Liaison Officer at the Signal School, had had many contacts with Korean military personnel studying there. The least accurate score was that of a captain with a B.A. in speech. He reported daily contact with close personal Korean friends and had spent ten months in Korea without previously having been there.

† The officer with the highest negative score, that is, the greatest underestimation of pro-U.S. views, was a captain with a high school diploma, seven years in the service, and 12 months of experience in Korea. He wrote in the biographical data sheet that he had had "very little" special knowledge about Korea before his arrival, "and what knowledge I did have was wrong in general." One may opine that his score reflects a leaning over backward from the pro-U.S. responses he may have expected before his Korean assignment. The respondent with the highest positive score, that is, the greatest overestimation of pro-U.S. views, was a captain with two years of college and 18 and one-half years in the service. He had spent 12 months in Korea on his present tour and 13 months on a previous tour. He reported daily contact with close personal Korean friends.

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RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE OFFICERS' EXPERTISE
AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

The following discussion of results will cover relationships found between expertise and the officers' biographical characteristics, dogmatism scores, social interaction with Koreans, and satisfaction with being assigned to Korea.

Biographical Characteristics of the Officers

Length of Time in Korea. The group that had been longer in Korea made more accurate estimates. Length of stay in Korea was the strongest single predictor of accuracy level in estimating the Korean survey data. Two groups of officers were compared. One consisted of those who had been in Korea for no more than five months, and the average was 2.3 months. The other group (which gave better estimates) had been in Korea eight months or more, and its average was 11 months. Incidentally, cross-correlations found that officers who had been longer in Korea reported closer interactions with Koreans and also tended to be more satisfied with being assigned to Korea.

Education. The officers were divided into three groups according to their education. Officers with postgraduate degrees (M.A.'s, M.D.'s, LL.B.'s, etc.) tended to be most accurate; officers without any college degree were next; officers who held only a bachelor's degree were least accurate. This result may indicate that the nongraduates make up in experience and maturity what they lack in formal education. Compared to the rest of the sample group, the average nongraduate had been more years in the service and more months in Korea, and he was senior in terms of rank and age. Officers with postgraduate degrees also showed more general closeness of interaction with Koreans than either college-only graduates or non-graduates. There was little difference in closeness of interaction between the college-only graduate and nongraduate groups. Major field of study was not shown to have a significant bearing on expertise.

Age. Year of birth was correlated with the directionality score. Older officers over-estimated pro-U.S. responses less.

Frequency of Interaction with Koreans

The American officers were asked to indicate the frequency of their contacts with different types of Koreans, namely, with Korean military personnel, government officials, white-collar workers and professionals, students, and shopkeepers and peddlers, and their closeness of interaction with Koreans in general.

Interaction with Korean white-collar workers and professionals was the best single predictor of ability to estimate Korean public opinions, not only among the measures of interaction but among all the measures used in this study. It appears that the white-collar workers and professionals with whom the officers had contact were in general highly educated and articulate English-speaking Koreans and were usually employed by the U.S. Army. The group included many translators, bookkeepers, and other office personnel.

Accuracy of U.S. officers' estimates increased with interaction with Korean shopkeepers and peddlers with whom the officers made contacts off U.S. Army bases.

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Officers who had more frequent contact with students tended to overestimate pro-U.S. responses. A number of these contacts occurred when officers taught English or advised Korean students. This finding may be explained by the type of students and the nature of the interaction: presumably these students were pro-American in their feelings. The more anti-American students probably do not seek out contacts with U.S. Army officers.

Officers who had more contact with students also tended to be more satisfied with their assignment to Korea. The causality of this finding does not appear to be clear-cut. Officers who were happier with their Korean assignment to start with may have been more ready to volunteer for work with Korean students, and respondents involved in teaching or advising friendly students may have found this made their stay in Korea more satisfying.

On the other hand, hardly any relationship was found between expertise and interaction with Korean military personnel and government officials.

Officers' Satisfaction with Being Assigned to Korea

Another significant indicator of expertise was that estimates by officers who were "extremely satisfied" with their tour of duty in Korea were more accurate than those by less satisfied officers.

As was stated, it was also found that officers who were more satisfied with their assignment to Korea tended to be less dogmatic, to have spent more time in Korea, and to interact more frequently with Korean students.

Dogmatism Scale

The more dogmatic respondents were less accurate, and they overestimated the Koreans' anti-U.S. views. The more dogmatic respondents also were less satisfied with their assignment to Korea.

Relative Contributions of Different Factors to Expertise

Up to this point, expertise was studied in relation to single characteristics of the officers, one factor at a time; for example, in relation to months in Korea or to education. In additional analyses, expertise was studied in relation to a number of factors at once. The analyses made it possible to identify the relative contributions of various factors to expertise.

In the analyses, the measures of expertise (directionality scores and accuracy scores) were correlated with the following factors: Age, months in Korea, marital status, interaction with Korean military, government officials, white-collar workers and professionals, students, shopkeepers and peddlers, general closeness of interaction, major source of information about Korea, dogmatism, and satisfaction with being assigned to Korea.

When the accuracy scores were correlated with the combination of factors, the best predictor of expertise was found to be length of stay in Korea. The group that had been longer in Korea made more accurate estimates. The next two strongest predictors were interaction with shopkeepers—the more interaction, the higher the accuracy—and dogmatism—the less dogmatic respondents were more accurate. In other words, the ability to estimate Korean

views accurately can be best predicted by ascertaining the officer's length of stay in Korea, his contacts with certain parts of the Korean civilian population, and the presence or absence in his personality of a characteristic that may be called closedmindedness or dogmatism.

It was found that if one correlates the combined factors with the directionality score, the best predictor of expertise is interaction with Korean white-collar workers and professionals. Officers who interacted less overestimated Korean pro-U.S. views. The next strongest factors, in order of decreasing strength, were (a) interaction with Korean students, (b) satisfaction—the more satisfied officers made less biased estimates—and (c) dogmatism—the more dogmatic respondents overestimated Korean anti-U.S. views.

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PART II

TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF RESEARCH

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODS

INSTRUMENTS

Three instruments * were used in the study: a biographic data form, the Korean opinion questionnaire (labeled "Social Perception Questionnaire"), and the dogmatism scale (labeled "Social Attitudes Scale"). These instruments are presented in the Appendix.

Biographic data form. Its purpose was to obtain information on the respondents' biographical background, experiences in Korea, and reaction to their assignment. General questions were asked concerning age, education, marital status, military rank, and number of years in the service. Concerning experience in Korea, information was sought on the length of the current and previous tours of duty, type of living facilities, special knowledge about Korea before arrival, and knowledge of the language. One question inquired about the respondents' major source of information about the Korean people while they were in Korea. A series of items asked about frequency of contact with various types of Korean nationals, namely, military personnel, government officials, white-collar workers and professionals, students, and shopkeepers and peddlers. Reactions to the Korean assignment were obtained on a six-point satisfaction scale ranging from "extremely satisfied" to "extremely dissatisfied."

Korean opinion questionnaire. This instrument when given to the officers was labeled "Social Perception Questionnaire." It was based on a public opinion survey conducted for the U.S. Information Agency in Seoul, Korea, in May 1965. That survey used a representative sample of 500 Seoul residents more than 18 years old. Of the respondents, half were male and half female. About three-fifths of the sample had at least some high school education. The original Korean survey respondents were interviewed individually by Korean university students.

The "Social Perception Questionnaire" based on this survey resulted in 23 questions used for statistical analysis. The 23 items dealt with opinions of the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and a few other countries. Three questions dealt with treatment of Negroes in the United States, and one item inquired into the respondent's knowledge of the then current dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia. The 161 U.S. Army officers were asked to estimate the percentage responses of the Korean sample; that is, the Korean population was divided into response categories, and the officers specified the percentage for each response category. The estimates of the 161 U.S. officers could then be compared with the "true" responses obtained from the Korean sample.

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* The instruments were prepared and labeled before the author began work on this study. Originally included were two forms on American and Korean word associations designed by Dr. Lorand B. Szalay of CRESS. The results will not be discussed in the present report.

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Items were presented to the respondents in the following form.

Koreans were asked:

IS THE UNITED STATES DOING ALL IT SHOULD TO PRE-
VENT A WORLD WAR?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the
following categories:

yes   _____ .

no   _____

don't know   _____ .

Total   __100%__

Dogmatism Scale. The instrument used was Rokeach's Final Form E including all 40 items described in his The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960, pp. 71-80). In order to avoid biasing the responses, the questionnaire was labeled, more neutrally, the "Social Attitudes Scale." Rokeach intended the scale primarily to measure individual differ- ences in openness or closedness of belief systems and secondarily, to measure general au- thoritarianism and intolerance.

This Dogmatism Scale consists of 40 brief statements. Respondents are asked to indi- cate their reactions on a six-point scale.

+1: I agree a little (score 5)   -1: I disagree a little (score 3)

+2: I agree on the whole (score 6)   -2: I disagree on the whole (score 2)

+3: I agree very much (score 7)   -3: I disagree very much (score 1)

A zero point is excluded in order to avoid noncommittal responses. Agreement is seen as in- dicating a closed mind, or dogmatism, disagreement as reflecting an open mind. In order to simplify calculations, all negative (-) numbers were transformed into positive (+) numbers by the addition of a constant of $+4$; for example, $-3(+4) = 1$ and $+3(+4) = 7$. Scores, then, could range from 1 to 7. For each individual, a total dogmatism score was obtained by adding across the 40 items. The widest possible range of scores extends, therefore, from 40 (40×1) to 280 (40×7), with high scores indicating closedmindedness, or dogmatism, and low scores openmindedness.

SAMPLE AND QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTRATION

The sample consisted of U.S. Army officers ranking from warrant officer and second lieutenant up to and including lieutenant colonel assigned to three major units in the Seoul- Inchon area in May-June 1966. All officers who had been in Korea (a) not more than five months or (b) at least eight months were identified by the major units' adjutants. These ad- jutants had been appointed project officers by the unit commanders. The normal tour of duty in Korea at the time was thirteen months. The two groups with longest and shortest service

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in Korea were selected in order to bring out any effects the length of stay in the country might have on questionnaire performance. Almost all officers were assigned to headquarters units such as supply, medical, and personnel sections rather than to field units. Many of the officers were interacting with their Korean counterparts in advisory capacities.

All officers who met the qualifications were requested to attend one briefing session on the study in May or June 1966. At the briefing sessions, a colonel and a research scientist explained in detail the nature and importance of the study and the purpose of the questionnaires and instructed the officers in how to fill them out. Then each officer was given a set of questionnaires in a self-addressed envelope to be returned as soon as possible. Questionnaires were not identified by officer names. Each package of questionnaires contained a form letter to the respondent identifying the study's sponsorship and the research organization conducting it. The letter also defined that the basic research purpose was to determine better methods for obtaining information from experts.

Three hundred questionnaires were distributed to officers. Eventually 161 completed sets of questionnaires were returned, i.e., 53.7%. A few officers omitted one or a few questions. This accounts for the fact that on some tabulations the total number of respondents was slightly fewer than 161. In addition, several incomplete sets of questionnaires were returned but were not usable. It has been the experience of the U.S. Army Research Unit, Korea, that mail-in questionnaire studies yield a return of about 50% to 54%, and it is doubted that a higher return could be expected. Officers who had not returned their questionnaires after a reasonable time received letters and notices from the various commands requesting cooperation. Also, reminders were carried in various unit publications.

Who were the non-respondents? Although no precise identification was available, reasonable guesses about who did not respond are possible. Some officers who had been in Korea only about three weeks returned their questionnaires empty and wrote that they were unqualified to answer them. Since the respondent group seems to include a relatively large number of college graduates (32 out of 161 possessing graduate degrees), particularly social science majors, one may assume that persons with this background were more interested in the study and were more likely to complete the questionnaires, and vice versa. One may assume that some officers were transferred to other units or out of Korea shortly after they received the questionnaires so that they never turned them in. The instruments were long, time-consuming and, at least in part, difficult and unfamiliar to the officers. Persons who were not especially motivated may well have felt too busy with more important tasks, may have forgotten the forms, or may have believed that their contribution could be only small anyhow. Also, they may have had some uncertainty about the anonymity of their replies. It was reported that in another study in Korea, a similar group of respondents was very reluctant to fill in questionnaires.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

The essential purpose of this study was to identify experts on a foreign population by means of a criterion. The criterion used was Korean popular responses to an opinion survey. Those Americans who came closest to estimating Korean responses were to be considered the most expert.

The original "Social Perception Questionnaire" contained 40 items. After the author of this report started work on the study, he discovered that the question wordings had been changed in a number of cases to the extent that the questions asked of the officers differed

from the questions given to the Korean sample, and it was doubtful whether estimates based on the altered questions could be meaningful and valid measures of expertise. After careful scrutiny by the author and another reviewer, 16 items of this type were eliminated. One question was dropped because a percentage given was misprinted.

The data collected were punched into IBM cards, and frequency distributions were prepared. Certain items of biographical information were found to be not useful and were therefore deleted from further statistical analysis. These items included the last educational institution attended (since there was too wide a variety). The age factor was found to overlap with year of graduation, number of years in the service, and military rank. Therefore, age alone was used for further computations. Knowledge of the Korean language was not found to be a discriminating item, since practically all respondents indicated a poor knowledge. (Only two respondents claimed fair reading and writing knowledge, and only six claimed better than poor speaking ability.) Housing was not further analyzed: Nearly all officers (143) lived in a U.S. government compound; eight lived in a foreign housing community; four lived within the Korean economy; and six did not report their living facility. Previous special knowledge about Korea was also not further analyzed: 111 claimed no special knowledge about Korea before their arrival; 26 indicated a previous tour; 24 reported other previous special knowledge (10 through literature, nine through military personnel, and five through formal study).

Scoring of the Social Perception Questionnaire

In order to measure the officers' estimates of the Korean attitudes, three types of scores were developed.

Accuracy score. On each questionnaire item, the respondents were asked to fill in three estimated percentages, two for specific response categories which may be called A and B, and a "don't know" percentage: A given item may be presented as follows for analytical purposes .

Koreans were asked:

IS THE UNITED STATES DOING ALL IT SHOULD TO PREVENT A WORLD WAR?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the following categories:

yes	(A)
no	(B)
don't know	
Total	100%

For each subject on each item the following computation was made:

$$\frac{A}{A + B} = C$$

The "don't know" category was not used for analysis, since the category as described in the questionnaire covered fewer types of responses than were used in the original U.S.I.A.

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opinion survey. Therefore it was felt that the most sensitive measure would be the distribution between substantive categories.

For each item, the same computation was repeated on the original Korean survey data:

$$\frac{A'}{A' + B'} = C'$$

The accuracy of an officer's estimate increases, therefore, as the difference between the true Korean responses and his estimate thereof $(C - C')$ becomes smaller. For each individual, the absolute values of $(C - C')$ were summed over the 23 items. The summation was called each respondent's "accuracy score."

Standardized accuracy score. For each item included in the accuracy score, the frequencies were distributed. Each item was then separately standardized around a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The standardized scores were summed for each respondent over the 23 items. The summation was called the "standardized accuracy score." These scores were calculated in case any strong peculiarities should show up in the frequency distributions. This did not occur, and it was found that these scores did not differ significantly from the accuracy scores. Therefore, the standardized scores will not be discussed further.

Directionality score. The accuracy scores dealt with the closeness of estimates to the Korean data regardless of over- or underestimation of the Korean responses. Another score was developed to take into account the direction of a respondent's inaccuracy, so that it could be determined whether certain background characteristics were related to systematic over- or underestimates.

For each item, the first two response categories were rearranged in such a way that the category implying a more pro-American or less pro-U.S.S.R. (or pro-Red China) attitude was labeled A; the category implying a more pro-U.S.S.R. (or pro-Red China) or less pro-American attitude was labeled B.* For example, question 6, "What is your impression of what the U.S. has been doing in international affairs?", was scored in such a way that responses for the category called "favorable" were labeled A and responses for the category called "unfavorable" were labeled B. The first response category was labeled A in all items except 3, 4, 5, 9, 17—in which it was labeled B.

For each respondent on each item, the following computation was made:

$$\frac{A}{A + B} = C$$

The result was then compared to the following equation for the Korean survey data:

$$\frac{A'}{A' + B'} = C'$$

The difference $(C - C')$ was determined, taking into account the sign. The sum of the differences $(C - C')$ over the 22 items is called the "directionality score."

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* Question 8, however, which concerns the Malaysia-Indonesia dispute, could not be readily categorized into pro- and anti-American responses. The question was therefore excluded from the directionality score so that it is based on only 22 items.

Factor Analyses

Both the accuracy scores and the directionality scores were factor analyzed. The technique employed was principal components factor analysis with squared multiple correlations inserted in the diagonals during first analysis. The factor analysis was reiterated twice, and the estimates of the new communalities were inserted each time. The four factors finally extracted from each accuracy and directionality score were rotated using a varimax rotation. It was hoped that the responses would fall readily into clear-cut factors to give a better understanding of the respondent's expertise. However, the results of the factor analysis were neither simple nor clear-cut, so they will not be discussed.

Statistical Tests of Relationships Between Expertise and Background Factors

To determine which background variables affected the respondents' estimates of Korean attitudes, a number of statistical tests were conducted. The criterion measures of expertise, namely, accuracy scores and directionality scores, were tested for their relationship to the following variables.

1. Age

2. Educational level

3. Major field of studies

4. Marital status

5. Length of time in Korea

6. Major source of information on Korea

7. Frequency of interaction with Koreans in general

8. Frequency of interaction with Korean military personnel

9. Frequency of interaction with Korean government officials

10. Frequency of interaction with Korean white-collar workers and professionals

11. Frequency of interaction with Korean students

12. Frequency of interaction with Korean shopkeepers and peddlers

13. Satisfaction with the Korean assignment

14. Dogmatism score

In addition, the relationships of the following three variables with the 14 other variables were determined: variable 7, general closeness of interaction with Koreans; variable 13, satisfaction with the Korean assignment; and variable 14, dogmatism score.

The following statistical tests were conducted in order to determine degree or significancy of these relationships.

1. Mean scores and standard deviations were computed for the criterion measures to show their relationships to variables 1 through 13. Significance was determined by either t tests or analyses of variance depending upon whether two or more groups were involved.

2. In a parallel fashion, mean dogmatism scores and standard deviations were calculated for variables 1 through 13, and their significances were tested.

3. Closeness of interaction with Koreans and satisfaction with the Korean assignment were tabulated as percentages of the other variables 1 through 13. Other percentage tables showed inversely proportions of interaction closeness and of satisfaction as related to the other background variables 1 through 13. Significance was tested by contingency coefficients.

4. Product-moment correlation coefficients were run for year of birth versus the criterion measures and dogmatism scores. For 150 degrees of freedom, the .05 point of significance corresponds to $r = .159$. The .01 point corresponds to $r = .208$. Mean years of birth and standard deviations were calculated for interaction closeness and satisfaction subgroups. Significance was tested by analyses of variance.

5. Product-moment correlation coefficients were determined for dogmatism scores versus accuracy and directionality scores.

6. A product-moment correlation coefficient was computed for accuracy versus directionality scores.

7. Multiple correlations were calculated for the directionality score and for the accuracy score versus year of birth, marital status, months in Korea, major source of information, dogmatism, satisfaction, and the six interaction measures.

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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

CRITERION MEASURES

The criterion used to measure expertise was the Korean survey data previously mentioned. The more accurately an officer's estimates compared with these data, the more expert he was judged to be. On the basis of the Korean Opinion Questionnaire, expertise was measured in two ways—by the directionality score and the accuracy score.

Directionality Score

The purpose of the directionality score was to determine whether there was a tendency to over- or underestimate the pro-American or anti-American views of the Koreans. The mean (average) score of all officers was .02, indicating virtually no bias in either direction. The standard deviation of the score .02 was 1.63. Individual officers' directionality scores ranged from -3.25 to -4.98.

Accuracy Score

The individual variables to which accuracy scores were significantly related are shown in overview in Table 1. The relationship of accuracy scores to variables considered in multiple correlation is treated in the section on "Multiple Correlations." The mean of all officers' accuracy scores was 4.55, with a standard deviation of .77. Individual accuracy scores ranged from 3.39 to 7.50. The mean of 4.55 over all 23 items corresponds to an average error of 21 percentage points per item. This appears to be a fairly large discrepancy and suggests that there may not have been a high level of expertise for the officer group. The directionality and accuracy scores were essentially not correlated (r = .05), because directionality scores are either positive or negative, and accuracy scores disregard signs entirely.

How can one account for the relatively low accuracy of the respondents' estimates? The first thought that comes to mind is that the sample was hardly a group of experts. It may be recalled that only two of the respondents claimed better than poor reading and writing knowledge of Korean, and only six indicated better than poor speaking ability. Also, nearly all officers lived in a U.S. government compound; only four lived within the Korean economy. The nature of the officers' work within American military units did not, on the whole, require contact with the general Korean population. Most respondents came to Korea not because of a special interest in the country but because they happened to be assigned there. Still, one may look within the sample for respondents who did relatively well and contrast them with respondents who did relatively poorly. In this sense, the findings may be of interest to the Army, for they indicate characteristics of officers who have relative, if not expert, ability to estimate popular attitudes of a foreign population.

There can be little doubt that the task assigned the respondents was very complex. They were asked not merely to estimate how Koreans in general felt about certain issues, but to divide the answers to each of the questions into percentages in three response categories. For persons who are not familiar with opinion survey research this appears to be a difficult task likely to encourage guesswork. One may well assume that most respondents were not accustomed to opinion survey techniques. To make the assignment even harder, the officers were asked to estimate Korean attitudes that had been measured twelve months earlier.

It may be asked whether the original survey accurately represented the expressed opinions of its sample. The survey report gives a detailed account of the research procedure, of the sample design and its execution, of interviewer characteristics, training, and double-checks, of respondent attitudes toward the questionnaire, interpretation of "no answer," "don't know," "can't say," and "no opinion" replies, etc. One may add that the survey was conducted for the U.S. Information Agency by a survey organization with many years of experience in the Far East. The task put to the American respondents was not to estimate "true" Korean attitudes but rather "to indicate how you would expect a group of South Koreans to respond to various questions in a public opinion poll." One may assume that the better informed an officer is, the better he can predict Korean responses to such a public opinion poll. It therefore appears that shortcomings of the original survey were not a major reason for the relative lack of expert knowledge among the American respondents.

The following discussion of results will first consider the measured variables one at a time. Subsequently, multiple correlations that take into account combinations of factors will be considered.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE

Under biographical characteristics will be considered the relationships to expert performance of five variables: length of stay in Korea, education, marital status, major source of information about Korea, and age.

Length of Time in Korea

The best single biographic predictor of performance in estimating the Korean survey data was length of stay in Korea. Among the respondents, 38 had been in Korea for five months or less, the average stay being 2.3 months; 117 had been in Korea eight months or longer with a mean stay of 11.0 months (see Table 2). This second group included eight officers who had been less than eight months in Korea on their present tour but more than eight months when current and previous tours in Korea were combined.

Five respondents had been in Korea for only one to three months but had spent at least one year elsewhere in the Far East. These five respondents were excluded from any computations involving length of stay in Korea for the following reasons: (a) It was felt that previous duty elsewhere, e.g., in Japan, was not equivalent to prior duty in Korea in terms of the criterion of expertise, i.e., estimating Korean public opinion; they were therefore not included in the long-staying group. (b) Five respondents were considered too small a number to test whether assignment elsewhere in the Far East would facilitate estimates of Korean views.

The group that had been in Korea longer made more accurate estimates (significant at the .05 level). Mean accuracy scores were 5.00 for the short-stay group (standard deviation = .77) and for the long-stay group 4.74 (SD = .69). The t value was 2.07 (see Table 3). This finding

TABLE 1

ACCURACY SCORES—SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES

Variable	Most Accurate Group			Least Accurate Group			Measure	Significance Test	
	Characteristic	Mean	SD	Characteristic	Mean	SD		Significance Level (%)	Degrees of Freedom
Months in Korea	Long stay	4.74	.69	Short stay	5.00	.77	$t = 2.07$	.05	156
Education: Highest degree attained	Adv. degree	4.64	.68	College degree	4.97	.79	$F = 2.44$	.10	2 and 153
Interaction with shop-keepers and peddlers	More in-teraction	4.72	.70	Less in-teraction	4.96	.79	$t = 1.30$	.10	154
Satisfaction with the Korean assignment	Extremely satisfied	4.66	.62	Moderately satisfied	5.01	.84	$F = 3.06$	.05	2 and 148

TABLE 2

NUMBER OF MONTHS SPENT IN KOREA

Short Stay (0-5 Months) N = 38		Long Stay (8-20 Months) N = 117	
Months	N	Months	N
0	2	8	13
1	13	9	14
2	5	10	25
3	9	11	23
4	6	12	25
5	3	13	6
Mean = 2.3 months		14	1
		15	3
		16	4
		17	1
		19	1
		20	1
		Mean = 11.0 months	

TABLE 3

MONTHS IN KOREA AND ACCURACY SCORES*

Accuracy	Months in Korea	Mean	SD
Most accurate group	Long stay	4.74	.69
Least accurate group	Short stay	5.00	.77

* Significant at the .05 level with a t value of 2.07.

was confirmed in the multiple correlation (see below). In the multiple correlation of accuracy with twelve variables, months in Korea had the strongest single correlation ($r = .26$).

This finding appears reasonable because (a) one may assume that even slight exposure to a foreign population will eventually tend to lead to greater familiarity with popular opinions and (b) although the original Korean views were obtained in May 1965, the U.S. officers were asked to estimate these views in May and June 1966. The officers who made up the group that had been in Korea longer (mean stay = 11.0 months) had an obvious advantage over the short-staying group (mean stay = 2.3 months) in estimating Korean views of the year before.

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Officers who had been longer in Korea reported closer interaction with Koreans (significant at the .05 level). This relationship is discussed in more detail below under "Social Interaction and Expert Performance."

Officers who had stayed longer in Korea tended to be more satisfied with their assignment in that country (significant at the .10 level). This finding is discussed in more detail below in "Satisfaction with the Korean Assignment and Expert Performance."

Education

Two measures of education were used: the highest degree attained and the major field of studies pursued toward that degree. Twenty-seven respondents had less than a college degree, 101 were college graduates, and 32 had advanced degrees (see Table 4). For purposes of

TABLE 4

EDUCATION: HIGHEST DEGREE ATTAINED

Level	Number	
Less than high school	1	
High school graduate	6	27
Less than bachelor's degree	20	
College graduate	101	
Master's degree	14	32
Ph.D., M.D., D.D.S., LL.B.	18	

statistical analysis, major fields of study were combined into three groups: (a) social sciences and humanities, (b) professional fields, and (c) all others (see Table 5). It had been hypothesized that the social science and humanities majors would be better estimators of Korean attitudes because of their training and interests. Contrary to expectations, major field of study was not shown to be a significant discriminator of expertise.

Officers with advanced degrees tended to have the best accuracy scores; officers without a college degree were next; and those holding only a college degree tended to have the poorest accuracy scores (significant at the .10 level). (Standardized accuracy scores reached the .05 level of significance.) The accuracy scores obtained are shown in Table 6.

It is not difficult to understand why officers with advanced degrees would be the most accurate estimators of Korean opinions. The finding that officers without a college degree did better than college graduates may be accounted for by the special characteristics of the nongraduate group. A review of the data suggests that members of the nongraduate group make up in experience and "maturity" what they lack in formal higher education. Although the total sample had a mean age of 32.7 years, the nongraduates' mean age was 42.2 years. It may be recalled that the long-staying group had spent a mean (for all tours of duty) of 11.0 months in Korea while the short-staying group had been 2.3 months in Korea on the average. In contrast, the non-college graduates had spent an average of 16.4 months in Korea. The mean number of

TABLE 5

EDUCATION: MAJOR FIELD OF STUDIES

Field	Number
Social sciences	34 ⎫
Humanities	7 ⎭ 41
Professional fields	31
Natural science	18 ⎫
Business	23 ⎪
Engineering	12 ⎪
Education (including physical education)	15 ⎬ 89
Military science	5 ⎪
No answer	16 ⎭

TABLE 6

EDUCATION AND ACCURACY SCORES*

Group	Mean	SD
College degree	4.97	.79
No college degree	4.78	.75
Advanced degree	4.64	.68

* $F = 2.44$, significant at the .10 level for 2 and 153 degrees of freedom.

years in the service for the total sample was 8.3, but the average nongraduate had spent 17.6 years in the service: The nongraduate group spent more years in the service on the average than the sample as a whole (see Table 7).

TABLE 7

COLLEGE GRADUATION AND YEARS IN THE SERVICE

Group	Number of Years in the Service			
	0-3	4-12	13-20	21-32
Total	65	51	34	12
Nongraduates	0	33	18	7

Rank was distributed as follows (raw data) (see Table 8).

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TABLE 8

COLLEGE GRADUATION AND MILITARY RANK

Group	Military Rank					
	War. Off.	2d Lt.	1st Lt.	Capt.	Maj.	Lt. Col.
Total sample	2	25	29	60	24	199
Nongraduates	1	1	--	8	8	9

Officers with postgraduate degrees showed the most general closeness of interaction with Koreans. There was little difference in closeness of interaction between the nongraduates and those who had only a college degree (significance at the .05 level). This finding is discussed below in the section on "Social Interaction and Expert Performance."

Marital Status

Three groups were distinguished: 62 officers were single, divorced, or separated; 98 officers were married; fourteen of these had their wives in Korea (see Table 9). The criterion measures were not significantly related to marital status.

TABLE 9

MARITAL STATUS

Status	No.
Single	60 ⎫
Divorced or separated	2 ⎭ 62
Married, wife not in Korea	84
Married, wife in Korea	14

Major Source of Information About the Korean People

Respondents were asked: "While in Korea what has been your major source of information about the Korean people?" Two groups were contrasted: those (85) who answered "personal experience" and all others (76) (see Table 10). Statistical tests did not show that the source of information, whether personal experience or other, was a significant discriminator of expertise.

Age

Age was indicated by year of birth. It was found to be closely related to military rank and number of years in the service (see Tables 11 and 12). Taken alone, it was not a significant discriminator of expertise. However, year of birth was positively correlated with the

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TABLE 10

MAJOR SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT THE KOREAN PEOPLE

Source	No.
Personal experience	85
U.S. publications (e.g., Time, Stars and Stripes, books)	25
Korean English-language newspapers	21
T.V. (Korean or U.S. Army)	13
Korean English-language radio	4
Other	7
No answer	6

(25, 21, 13, 4, 7, 6 bracketed together = 76)

TABLE 11

DECADE OF BIRTH AND MILITARY RANK

Decade of Birth	War. Off.	2d Lt.	1st Lt.	Capt.	Maj.	Lt. Col.	No Ans.	Total
1900's					1		1	2
1910's					2	9		11
1920's	2			5	12	10		29
1930's		1	1	52	9			63
1940's		24	28	3			1	56
Total	2	25	29	60	24	19	2	161

TABLE 12

YEAR OF BIRTH AND YEARS IN THE SERVICE

Year of Birth	Years in Service							
	1-4	5-8	9-12	13-16	17-20	21-24	25-28	29-32
1908-1914					4			
1915-1920				2	2	2	3	1
1921-1926			1	3	11	5	1	
1927-1932	3	3	5	7	3			
1933-1938	8	23	8	2				
1939-1949	62	2						

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directionality score in the multiple correlation (see section on "Multiple Correlation," below). Younger officers tended more to overestimate pro-U.S. responses.

SOCIAL INTERACTION AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE

The American officers were asked to indicate the frequency of interaction with different types of Koreans. Six measures of interaction with Koreans were statistically tested.

1. General closeness of interaction

2. Interaction with white-collar workers and professionals

3. Interaction with shopkeepers and peddlers

4. Interaction with students

5. Interaction with military personnel

6. Interaction with government officials

General Closeness of Social Interaction

To obtain an index of general closeness of interaction with Koreans, four groups in descending order of closeness were defined (number of officers in the group is indicated in parentheses).

1. Those who had daily, weekly, or monthly contact with Korean relatives (7)

2. All others who had at least monthly contact with close personal Korean friends (58)

3. All others who had daily or weekly contact with Korean casual acquaintances (47)

4. All remaining (48)

Officers with postgraduate degrees showed most general closeness of interaction with Koreans. There was little difference in interaction closeness among college graduates and nongraduates. Of those who held an advanced degree, 63% had daily or weekly contact with close personal Korean friends; only 33% of college graduates and 26% of nongraduates did so (see Table 13). A longer stay in Korea was associated with closer general interaction with Koreans. Contact with close personal Korean friends was reported by 42% of the longer-staying group and only 10% of the short-staying group (see Table 14). Officers who had more frequent interactions with Korean government officials also tended to have closer general interactions with Koreans. Contact with close personal Korean friends was reported by 48% of those who interacted at least monthly with government officials and by 29% of those who did not (see Table 15). Respondents who had more frequent contact with Korean shopkeepers and peddlers tended to report closer general interactions with Koreans (see Table 16).

Interaction with Korean White-Collar Workers and Professionals

This type of contact was the best single predictor of ability to estimate Korean public opinions, not only among measures of interaction but among all measures used in the study (significant at the .01 level). It appears that the white-collar workers and professionals with whom the officers had contact were in general highly educated and articulate English-speaking Koreans and were usually employed by the U.S. Army. The group included many translators,

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TABLE 13

EDUCATION AND CLOSENESS OF INTERACTION*
(In Percent)†

Closeness of Interaction	No Degree	College Degree Only	Advanced Degree
Contact with Korean relatives	7	5	0
Contact with close personal friends	26	31	63
Daily or weekly contact with casual acquaintances	33	32	19
All remaining	33	33	19

* Chi square = 13.02, significant at the .05 level for 6 degrees of freedom.

† Percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding error.

TABLE 14

MONTHS IN KOREA AND CLOSENESS OF INTERACTION*
(In Percent)

Closeness of Interaction	0 - 5 months	6 - 20 months
Contact with Korean relatives	5	4
Contact with close personal friends	19	42
Daily or weekly contact with casual acquaintances	46	24
All remaining	30	30

* Chi square = 8.32, significant at the .05 level for 3 degrees of freedom.

bookkeepers, and other office personnel. This group seems to have served the officers as the best source of information on the views of the Korean people or, more precisely, of the Seoul population at large. A look at Table 17 will show that the officers' group with more frequent contact was heavily loaded with persons who had daily contact with such Koreans.

Estimate of directionality was highly related to interaction with white-collar workers and professionals (t = 2.83, significant at the .01 level) (see Table 18). These findings indicate that the officers with more frequent contact tended to make less pro-American estimates. On the other hand, officers with less frequent contact tended to overestimate pro-U.S. responses. Thus, frequent contact with English-speaking (and presumably pro-American) white-collar workers and professionals, most of them employed by the U.S. Army, seems to have resulted in a more realistic estimate of Korean popular views. This finding was confirmed in the multiple correlation. In the multiple correlation of directionality with twelve variables, interaction with white-collar and professional persons was the strongest single correlation (r .21) found.

TABLE 15

GENERAL CLOSENESS OF INTERACTION AND CONTACT WITH
KOREAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS*
(In Percent)+

General Closeness of Interaction	Contact with Korean Government Officials	
	At Least Monthly (N = 60)	Rarely or Never (N = 100)
Contact with Korean relatives	5	4
Contact with close personal friends	48	29
Daily or weekly contact with casual acquaintances	23	33
All remaining	23	34

* Chi square = 6.56, significant at the .10 level for 3 degrees of freedom.

† Percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding error.

TABLE 16

GENERAL CLOSENESS OF INTERACTION AND CONTACT WITH
SHOPKEEPERS AND PEDDLERS*
(In Percent)+

General Closeness of Interaction	Contact with Shopkeepers and Peddlers	
	Daily or Weekly (N = 56)	Not More Often Than Monthly (N = 104)
Contact with Korean relatives	4	5
Contact with close personal friends	41	34
Daily or weekly contact with casual acquaintances	38	25
All remaining	18	37

* Chi square = 6.85, significant at the .10 level for 3 degrees of freedom.

† Percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding error.

Interaction with Shopkeepers and Peddlers

Table 19 shows the reported frequency of contacts between officers and Korean shop-keepers and peddlers. In contrast to the white-collar workers and professionals, the present group of shopkeepers and peddlers were not allowed on U.S. Army bases, so that contacts occurred off base. Officers who had daily or weekly contact with shopkeepers and peddlers tended to make more accurate estimates than those with less contact (see Table 20). In the multiple correlation between accuracy and twelve predictor variables, interaction with shop-keepers and peddlers was the second strongest predictor variable for accuracy (see below, in the section on "Multiple Correlations").

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TABLE 17

CONTACT WITH KOREAN WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS
AND PROFESSIONALS

Frequency	No.	
Daily	63	85
Weekly	22	
Monthly	22	
Rarely or never	32	76
No answer	22	

TABLE 18

CONTACT WITH WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS AND PROFESSIONALS
AND DIRECTIONALITY SCORES

Frequency	No.	Mean	SD
Daily or weekly contact	82	-0.30	1.44
Not more than monthly contact	73	0.43	1.72
Total sample	155	0.02	1.63

TABLE 19

CONTACT WITH SHOPKEEPERS AND PEDDLERS

Frequency	No.
Daily	9
Weekly	47
Monthly	38
Rarely or never	42
No answer	25

Interaction with Korean Students

It might be expected that students should be a good source of information on Korean views as expressed by the public opinion survey. The survey sample of 500 Koreans over-represented the more educated portion of the Seoul population. As Table 21 shows, only 36 officers reported daily or weekly contact with students. A number of these contacts occurred when officers taught English to Korean students aged about 16 to 25. In other cases, officers served as advisors to student groups.

TABLE 20

CONTACT WITH SHOPKEEPERS AND PEDDLERS
AND ACCURACY SCORES*

Frequency	Accuracy Scores	
	Mean	SD
Daily or weekly contact	4.72	.70
Less than weekly contact	4.96	.79

* This finding was significant at the .10 level with a t value of 1.90.

TABLE 21

CONTACT WITH STUDENTS

Frequency	No.	
Daily	8	
Weekly	28	36
Monthly	34	
Rarely or never	61	124
No answer	29	

Directionality scores were significantly correlated with student interaction. Officers who had more frequent contact with students tended to overestimate pro-U.S. responses. This finding may be explained by the type of students and the nature of the interaction. Presumably these students were pro-American in their feelings. The more anti-American students probably did not seek out contacts with U.S. Army officers.

Officers who had more contact with students also tended to be more satisfied with their assignment in Korea (see Table 22). The reason for this finding does not appear to be clear-cut. Officers who were happier with their Korean assignment to begin with may have been more ready to volunteer for work with Korean students; also, respondents involved in teaching or advising friendly students may have found that this made their stay in Korea more satisfying.

Interaction with Korean Military Personnel

No variables were significantly related to interaction with military personnel. This may result from the fact that the majority of respondents had frequent contact with Korean military personnel (see Table 23). Daily or weekly interactions with the Korean military were reported by 117 officers.

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TABLE 22

CONTACT WITH STUDENTS AND SATISFACTION
WITH THE KOREAN ASSIGNMENT*
(In Percent)

Satisfaction Level	Contact with Students	
	Daily or Weekly (N = 36)	Not More Often Than Monthly (N = 124)
Dissatisfied or slightly satisfied	22	25
Moderately satisfied	28	45
Extremely satisfied	50	30

* Chi square was 5 43, significant at the .10 level.

TABLE 23

CONTACT WITH KOREAN MILITARY PERSONNEL

Frequency	Number	
Daily	82	
Weekly	35	
Monthly	13	62
Rarely or never	14	
No answer	17	

Interaction with Korean Government Officials

This variable was significantly related only to general contact with Koreans. This relationship was discussed above (see Table 15).

Interaction with Korean Servants

This variable was not statistically tested because it did not divide the sample sufficiently. Daily contact with servants was reported by 115 officers, and weekly contact was reported by another eleven.

Other Types of Interaction

The biographic data form provided space to write in other types of interaction with Koreans. Eight officers reported at least monthly contact with women, eight had at least weekly contact with blue-collar workers, six reported daily or weekly business interactions, and one indicated daily contact for the purpose of recreation.

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SATISFACTION WITH THE KOREAN ASSIGNMENT AND
EXPERT PERFORMANCE

Respondents had been asked to indicate their sat:sfaction so far with being assigned to Korea. A rather high proportion of officers indicated "extreme" satisfaction with their assignment (see Table 24). Fifty officers said they were extremely satisfied, 66 were moderately satisfied, and only 22 were dissatisfied (fifteen moderately so, and seven slightly). It may be asked why so many officers expressed satisfaction when some informal accounts hold that Korea was not considered a choice assignment among Army personnel. One of the reasons for this expression of satisfaction may be that at the time of the study many Army men were sent to Vietnam and that, in comparison, a Korean assignment may have been more attractive to some. Another reason may have been that some officers were not certain of the anonymity of the questionnaires.

TABLE 24

SATISFACTION WITH THE KOREAN ASSIGNMENT

Satisfaction Level	Number
Extremely dissatisfied	0 ⎫
Moderately dissatisfied	15 ⎬ 39
Slightly dissatisfied	7 ⎬
Slightly satisfied	17 ⎭
Moderately satisfied	66
Extremely satisfied	50
No answer	6

Expressed satisfaction was significantly related to accuracy scores. This relationship was not unilinear. Rather, the extremely satisfied group made the most accurate estimates, and the moderately satisfied group was least accurate (F = 3.06, significant at the .05 level) (see Table 25). These findings lend partial support to the hypothesis in that at least the most satisfied officers made the most accurate estimates, although the less satisfied and the dissatisfied respondents did not differ widely in accuracy.

In the multiple correlation with directionality, it was found that officers who were most satisfied with being assigned to Korea a, o tended to think of Korean opinions as being more pro-American (see below, the section, " iultipie Correlations").

The more satisfied officers tended to be less dogmatic (see Table 26). This relationship is monotonic. See also the section below, "Multiple Correlations."

Respondents who interacted more frequently with students were more satisfied (see above, Table 22).

Officers who had been in Korea longer tended to be more satisfied with their assignment in that country. Of the short-timers, 38% were dissatisfied or slightly satisfied, while only 21% of the old-timers felt that way (see Table 27).

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TABLE 25

EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AND ACCURACY SCORES*

Satisfaction Level	Accuracy	
	Mean	SD
Dissatisfied or slightly satisfied	4.96	.82
Moderately satisfied	5.01	.84
Extremely satisfied	4.66	.62

* F = 3.06, significant at the .05 level for 2 and 148 degrees of freedom.

TABLE 26

EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AND DOGMATISM SCORES

Group	No.	Mean Dogmatism Score	SD
Total sample	155	145.1	23.6
Dissatisfied or only slightly satisfied	39	151.6	23.9
Moderately satisfied	65	142.7	20.0
Extremely satisfied	50	139.6	24.6

TABLE 27

LENGTH OF TIME IN KOREA AND SATISFACTION WITH THE KOREAN ASSIGNMENT*
(In Percent)+

Satisfaction Level	Number of Months in Korea	
	0 to 5	8 to 20
Dissatisfied or slightly satisfied	38	21
Moderately satisfied	41	39
Extremely satisfied	22	39

* Chi square = 5.33, significant at the .10 level for 2 degrees of freedom.

+ Percentages do not add up to 100% because of rounding error.

DOGMATISM AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE

It had been hypothesized that the more dogmatic or closedminded respondents would be less accurate in estimating Korean responses. However, dogmatism as an included predictor was not significantly related to accuracy. The only statistical significances with the directionality and accuracy scores were obtained in the multiple correlations: namely, the more dogmatic or closedminded respondents tended to overestimate the Koreans' anti-U.S. views

and views favoring the U.S.S.R. and Red China. The more dogmatic respondents also tended to be less accurate. See Tables 28 and 29 and "Multiple Correlations."

TABLE 28

MULTIPLE CORRELATION—DIRECTIONALITY (PREDICTIVE POWER OR
PROPORTION OF CRITERION VARIANCE EXPLAINED)[*]

Predictor	R	R^2	Cumulative Contribution to R^2
Interaction with white-collar workers and professionals	.21	.04	.044
Interaction with students	.24	.06	.016
Satisfaction	.26	.07	.008
Dogmatism	.28	.08	.013
Interaction with government officials	.29	.09	.005
Marital status	.30	.09	.005
Year of birth	.32	.10	.012
Months in Korea	.33	.11	.008
Major source of information	.34	.12	.005
Interaction with shopkeepers	.34	.12	.001

* Note: Only correlations accounting for at least 1% of the variance (cumulative contribution of .010) are discussed in the text.

Dogmatism scores were tested for significant relation with all the background variables. The only significant finding was that the more dogmatic respondents were less satisfied with their assignment to Korea ($F = 3.30$, significant at the .05 level) (see Table 26). The sample's distribution is shown in Table 24.

MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS

Up to here, results were discussed in terms of single discriminatory variables, one at a time. The following analysis employs multiple correlations for the directionality score and the accuracy score with regard to the following twelve variables.

1. Year of birth

2. Months in Korea (up to five months vs. eight months and longer)

3. Marital status (married vs. all others)

4. Interaction closeness (relative or close personal friends vs. all less close interactions)

5. Interaction with Korean military (daily vs. less frequent)

6. Interaction with Korean government officials (at least monthly vs. less frequent)

7. Interaction with Korean white-collar workers and professionals (daily and weekly vs. less frequent)

8. Interaction with students (daily and weekly vs. less frequent)

9. Interaction with shopkeepers and peddlers (daily and weekly vs. less frequent)

10. Major source of information (personal experience vs. other)

11. Satisfaction (moderately and extremely satisfied vs. all others)

12. Dogmatism (raw score)

TABLE 29

MULTIPLE CORRELATION—ACCURACY (PREDICTIVE POWER OR
PROPORTION OF CRITERION VARIANCE EXPLAINED)*

Predictor	R	R²	Cumulative Contribution to R²
Months in Korea	.26	.07	.068
Interaction with shopkeepers	.30	.09	.023
Dogmatism	.34	.11	.022
Interaction closeness	.34	.12	.005
Marital status	.35	.12	.005
Interaction with government officials	.36	.13	.004
Interaction with white-collar workers and professionals	.36	.13	.003
Major source of information	.36	.13	.002
Satisfaction	.37	.13	.001
Interaction with students	.37	.13	.001

* Note: Only correlations accounting for at least 1% of the variance (cumulative contribution of .010) are discussed in the text.

The multiple correlations used the data available fo the 155 respondents who had given answers on all twelve variables. The purpose of t' .ultiple correlations was to arrive at the best prediction of expertise, taking into account just one variable but a combination of variables at the same time.

Directionality Score

The highest correlation of the directionality score with a single factor is provided by interaction with Korean white-collar and professional persons before the other eleven variables are added to the equation. This result confirms the previous finding that officers with less frequent contact tended to overestimate pro-U.S. responses. The $r = .21$, and the F ratio of 7.10 is significant at the .01 level (degrees of freedom = 1 and 153). When first introduced, interaction with these Koreans accounts for 4.4% of the total variance.

The predictive power can be increased when additional variables are considered. The best multiple correlation within the .05 level of significance is R = .34 for an F ratio of 1.93. The ten variables included in this multiple correlation are presented in Table 28. They account for 11.8% of the variance.

When the multiple correlations were computed, the following individual correlation coefficients were found (see Table 30).

TABLE 30

CORRELATIONS OF PREDICTORS WITH DIRECTIONALITY AND
ACCURACY SCORES

Predictor	Directionality	Accuracy
Months in Korea	-.07	-.26
Interaction with white-collar workers and professionals	.21	.07
Dogmatism	-.08	.15
Interaction with shopkeepers	-.01	.15
General closeness of interaction	.03	.14
Satisfaction	.12	.03

Accuracy Score

The highest correlation with a single variable is given by length of stay in Korea before the other variables are included in the equation. In other words, the group that had been in Korea longer made more accurate estimates of Korean opinions. The r = .26, and the F ratio of 11.2 is significant at the .01 level (for 1 and 153 degrees of freedom). When first introduced, time in Korea accounts for 6.8% of the total variance (see Table 29).

The multiple correlation with accuracy reaches R = .34 when two additional variables are included, namely, interaction with shopkeepers and dogmatism. The three factors account for 11.3% of the total variance. The F ratio of 6.41 is significant at the .01 level (for 3 and 151 degrees of freedom). Accuracy increases as a function of interaction with shopkeepers, and as a function of lack of dogmatism.

The highest multiple correlation for accuracy at the .05 level of significance is obtained when ten variables are considered (see Table 30). For the combined ten factors, the R = .37 at an F ratio of 2.23 (for 10 and 144 degrees of freedom). The ten variables account for 13.4% of the total variance.

In general terms, the multiple correlation indicates that accuracy in estimating Korean opinions can be best predicted by a combination of (a) length of stay in Korea, (b) contacts with certain parts of the Korean civilian population during that stay, and (c) a personality characteristic which may be called openmindedness or an absence of dogmatism.

APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRES*

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* The questionnaires are reproduced verbatim.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

The page you have received contains five different questionnaires. They are arranged in the order in which we would like you to take them. It is important to the success of this study that each instrument be completed in the exact order in which it is presented. Therefore, please do not leaf through the package or examine any of the forms prior to completing the preceding one. Once you have completed one questionnaire please do not examine or refer back to it until you have answered all of the questions on all of the other instruments. Once you have done this feel free to look at any of the instruments, but please do not change any of your responses. This too is imperative, if we are to collect valid information.

The package consists of five forms, labelled A through E.* The estimated time to complete all questionnaires is one and one-half hours. It is desirable that all materials be answered in a single "sitting." Two of the five forms involve time limits. Therefore, before you begin please make sure to have a watch with a second hand. The specific instructions with regard to time appear on the cover sheet of the appropriate instrument.

In order to insure that each person's responses are not influenced by someone else, it is important that you avoid discussion of the materials with others until after both of you have completed the forms.

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* In this report, the labels are not used, because two of the forms are not included for the reason given on p. 15.

BIOGRAPHIC DATA FORM

1. Date of Birth_____
                    Month   Day   Year

2. Education_____
          Highest degree   Year   institution   Major

3. Military Rank_____ 4. No. years in Service_____

5. No. months in Korea (Present tour)_____

6. Indicate in what Korean locales you have been and for how long. Indicate only those places in which you have lived for one month or more.

   _____

   _____

7. If you have completed previous duty tours in Korea or in other Far Eastern countries, please indicate country and the duration of each tour.

   _____

   _____

8. Indicate knowledge of the Korean language.

Reading				Speaking				Writing			
Exc.	Good	Fair	Poor	Exc.	Good	Fair	Poor	Exc.	Good	Fair	Poor

9. Marital Status
       Single_____ Married_____ Divorced_____ Widowed_____
                                   or
                                Separated

10. If you are currently married, is your wife living with you in Korea?_____

11. Nationality (native born) of your wife.
        American_____ Korean_____Other_____
                                        (please specify)

12. We would like to determine with what kinds of Koreans you have interacted and the amount of interaction you experienced in each such relationship. Below are listed some possible kinds of contacts which you may have had. Please indicate the extent of your contact

for each category. If you have had some special interaction with Koreans not covered in our list please feel free to elaborate in the space provided under "other."

	Daily	Weekly	Monthly	Rarely or Never
Close personal friends	( )	( )	( )	( )
Casual Acquaintances	( )	( )	( )	( )
Relatives	( )	( )	( )	( )
Servants	)	( )	( )	( )
Military	( )	( )	( )	( )
Government Officials	( )	( )	( )	( )
White-collar workers & professionals	( )	( )	( )	( )
S' 'ents	( )	( )	( )	( )
Shopkeepers-Peddlers	( )	( )	( )	( )
Other (please specify)	( )	( )	( )	( )

13. In what type of facility do you live?

    a. U.S. government compound (e.g., Yongsan)_____

    b. On the Korean economy (e.g., in a Korean community, Korean hotel)_____

    c. Foreign housing community (e.g., Itaewon or U.N. village)_____

    d. Other (please specify)_____

14. While in Korea what has been your major source of information about the Korean people?

    Korean English language radio_____

    Korean English language newspapers_____

    Television (Korean or U.S. Army)_____ _____

    U.S. publications (e.g., Time, Stars & Stripes, Books)_____

    Personal Experiences_____

    Other (please specify)_____

15. Did you have any special knowledge about Korea before you arrived (please specify)?

16. To what extent would you consider your tour of duty in Korea, thus far, to be satisfactory?
Indicate by checking one of the alternatives given below.

( ) Extremely dissatisfied

( ) Moderately dissatisfied

( ) Slightly dissatisfied

( ) Slightly satisfied

( ) Moderately satisfied

( ) Extremely satisfied

SOCIAL PERCEPTION QUESTIONNAIRE*

This questionnaire will help us to determine how well you can estimate Korean attitudes and opinions toward social and political issues. You will be asked to indicate how you would expect a group of South Koreans to respond to various questions in a public opinion poll. The questions are those which were used in a public opinion survey conducted and completed in Seoul in May 1965.

A sample of 500 adult South Koreans were interviewed. Of this group, about one-half were male the other half female. With respect to education, about three-fifths of the sample had received some high school education, had graduated from high school, or had had university training. Korean university students conducted all of the interviews by questioning each person individually.

A sample question asked of the Koreans appears below:

WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF INDIA?

GOOD	_____
BAD	_____
NEITHER	40%
DON'T KNOW	_____
TOTAL	100%

The questions as they will be presented to you will be in a form similar to that which appears above. You will be asked to estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the categories provided. Some questions have three response categories, while others have four (as in the question above). Whenever a four category question is presented, one of the actual perc_____ ___ will be p_____. Therefore, you will have to make only ___ __ estimates. For either type of question, three or four categories, the total should add to 100%.

Read the question and the response categories at the left, carefully. Decide how you would expect Koreans to respond to each question and write in your percentage estimates on the blank lines. It should be noted that the DON'T KNOW category, in addition to people who honestly had no opinion for a particular question, included persons who refused to answer because they were afraid to or felt the question was too personally sensitive to warrant a reply.

Regardless of how extensive or limited your knowledge is of Korea and Koreans, some of these questions should be relatively easy for you to answer correctly. Others will be more difficult. In any case we ask you to answer all of the questions to the best of your ability.

_____

* The questionnaire contains only the 23 items used in the analysis; the items have been renumbered accordingly.

1. Koreans were asked:

ARE THE BASIC INTERESTS OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES IN AGREEMENT?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the following categories:

AGREE   _____

DIFFERENT   _____

DON'T KNOW   _____

TOTAL   100%

2. Koreans were asked:

IS THE UNITED STATES DOING ALL IT SHOULD TO PREVENT A WORLD WAR?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the following categories:

YES   _____

NO   _____

DON'T KNOW   _____

TOTAL   100%

3. Koreans were asked:

IS THE SOVIET UNION DOING ALL IT SHOULD TO PREVENT A WORLD WAR?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the following categories:

YES   _____

NO   _____

DON'T KNOW   _____

TOTAL   100%

4. Koreans were asked:

IS COMMUNIST CHINA DOING ALL IT SHOULD TO PREVENT A WORLD WAR?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the
following categories:

YES _____

NO _____

DON'T KNOW _____

TOTAL 100%

5. Koreans were asked:

WHAT IS YOUR IMPRESSION OF WHAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN DOING IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the
following categories:

FAVORABLE _____

UNFAVORABLE _____

DON'T KNOW _____

TOTAL 100%

6. Koreans were asked:

WHAT IS YOUR IMPRESSION OF WHAT THE U.S. HAS BEEN DOING IN INTER-
NATIONAL AFFAIRS?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the
following categories:

FAVORABLE _____

UNFAVORABLE _____

DON'T KNOW _____

TOTAL 100%

49

7. Koreans were asked:

HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE DO YOU HAVE IN THE ABILITY OF THE U.S. TO
DEAL WISELY WITH PRESENT WORLD PROBLEMS?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the
following categories:

VERY GREAT	_____
CONSIDERABLE	_____
NOT VERY MUCH	5%
DON'T KNOW	_____
TOTAL	100%

8. Koreans were asked:

HAVE YOU READ OR HEARD ABOUT A DISPUTE GOING ON BETWEEN MALAYSIA
AND INDONESIA?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the
following categories:

YES	_____
NO	_____
DON'T KNOW	_____
TOTAL	100%

9. Koreans were asked:

HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE DO YOU HAVE IN THE ABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION
TO DEAL WISELY WITH PRESENT WORLD PROBLEMS?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the
following categories:

VERY GREAT	_____
CONSIDERABLE	_____
NOT VERY MUCH	19%
DON'T KNOW	_____
TOTAL	100%

10. Koreans were asked:

WHAT WORLD POLITICAL LEADERS OUTSIDE KOREA, NOW IN POWER, DO YOU ADMIRE MOST?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the following categories:

JOHNSON	_____
DE GAULLE	_____
OTHERS	13%
NONE, DON'T KNOW	_____
TOTAL	100%

11. Koreans were asked:

WHAT COUNTRY OF THE WORLD WILL BE STRONGEST 25 YEARS FROM NOW?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the following categories:

USA	_____
COMMUNIST CHINA	_____
W. GERMANY	5%
KOREA	4%
OTHERS, DON'T KNOW	_____
TOTAL	100%

12. Koreans were asked:

WHICH COUNTRY IS AHEAD ON STRENGTH IN EDUCATION?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the following categories:

U.S.	_____
SOVIET UNION	_____
EQUAL	3%
DON'T KNOW	_____
TOTAL	100%

13. Koreans were asked:

WHICH COUNTRY IS AHEAD ON STRENGTH IN SPACE DEVELOPMENTS?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the
following categories:

U.S.   _____

SOVIET UNION   _____

EQUAL   ____9.____

DON'T KNOW   _____

TOTAL   100°

14. Koreans were asked:

WHICH COUNTRY HAS THE GREATER NUMBER OF SPACE ACHIEVEMENTS?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the
following categories:

U.S.   _____

SOVIET UNION   _____

EQUAL   ____5.____

DON'T KNOW   _____

TOTAL   100°

15. Koreans were asked:

WHICH COUNTRY WILL BE FIRST TO LAND A MAN ON THE MOON?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the
following categories:

U.S.   _____

SOVIET UNION   _____

DON'T KNOW   _____

TOTAL   100°

52

16. Koreans were asked:

WHICH COUNTRY DO YOU THINK OFFERS GREATER ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY FOR AVERAGE CITIZENS?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the following categories:

U.S.	_____
SOVIET UNION	_____
EQUAL	1%
DON'T KNOW	_____
TOTAL	100%

17. Koreans were asked:

WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT MOST COUNTRIES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA WILL COME UNDER THE CONTROL OF COMMUNIST CHINA IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the following categories:

LIKELY	_____
NOT LIKELY	_____
DON'T KNOW	_____
TOTAL	100%

18. Koreans were asked:

WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE TREATMENT OF NEGROES IN THE U.S.?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the following categories:

GOOD	_____
BAD	_____
NEITHER	13%
DON'T KNOW	_____
TOTAL	100%

19. Koreans were asked:

WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF U.S. GOVERNMENT'S ACTIONS IN REGARD TO
EQUAL RIGHTS FOR NEGROES IN U.S.?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the
following categories:

    FAVORABLE   _____

    UNFAVORABLE   _____

    DON'T KNOW   _____

    TOTAL   100

20. Koreans were asked:

DO YOU THINK MOST KOREANS ARE GETTING THEIR FAIR SHARE OF THE
GOOD THINGS IN LIFE?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the
following categories:

    FAIR SHARE   _____

    LESS THAN FAIR SHARE_____

    DON'T KNOW   _____

    TOTAL   100%

21. Koreans were asked:

DO YOU THINK IT IS A GOOD OR BAD THING FOR KOREA TO HAVE U.S.
COMPANIES OPERATING HERE?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the
following categories:

    GOOD   _____

    BAD   _____

    DON'T KNOW   _____

    TOTAL   100%

22. Koreans were asked:

WHAT COUNTRY WOULD YOU SAY IS THE STRONGEST WORLD POWER AT THE PRESENT TIME

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the following categories:

U.S.A.	_____
U.S.S.R.	_____
OTHERS	54
DON'T KNOW	_____
TOTAL	100%

23. Koreans were asked:

DO YOU THINK THAT THE MAJORITY OF WHITE PEOPLE IN THE U.S. ARE FOR OR AGAINST EQUAL RIGHTS FOR NEGROES?

Estimate the percentage of Koreans who responded in each of the following categories:

MAJORITY FOR	_____
MAJORITY AGAINST	_____
DON'T KNOW	_____
TOTAL	100%

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SOCIAL ATTITUDES SCALE

The following questionnaire is designed to study what the general public thinks and feels about a number of important social and personal questions. The best answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. There are no right or wrong answers. We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you do.

Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one.

Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel in each case.

+1: I AGREE A LITTLE	-1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
+2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE	-2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
+3: I AGREE VERY MUCH	-3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

For example, you might be asked to give your opinion on the following statement:

_____ "Most people can be depended on to come through in a pinch."

If you tend to agree on the whole with this statement, you would write +2 in the margin to the left. If you happen to disagree a little, you would then write -1 in the left margin.

If you find that the numbers to be used in answering do not adequately indicate your own opinion, use the one which is closest to the way you feel.

____1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.

____2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

____3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

____4. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.

____5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

____6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.

____7. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

____8. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

____9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

____10. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.

____11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.

____12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

____13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.

____14. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

____15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

____16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

____17. If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to the world.

____18. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of really great thinkers.

____19. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.

____20. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.

____21. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

____22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

____23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.

____24. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

____25. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from the way we do.

____26. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.

____27. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same thing he does.

____28. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than by those in the opposing camp.

____29. A group that tolerates too much differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.

____30. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

____31. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.

____32. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.

____33. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

____34. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.

_____35. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

_____36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.

_____37. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.

_____38. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all."

_____39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on.

_____40. Most people just don't know what's good for them.

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13 ABSTRACT

This study was designed to identify which U.S. Army officers would be best able to estimate the views of a foreign population. One hundred and sixty-one U.S. Army officers stationed in Korea were studied. Statistical analysis showed that expertise varied with time spent in Korea, interaction with certain Koreans, openmindedness, satisfaction with the assignment to Korea, and education.

This study may be useful in suggesting factors to be considered in selecting officers for assignments in psychological operations, civil affairs, intelligence and, in general, officers from whom to solicit estimates of the views of a foreign population.

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| 14 | | LINK A | | LINK B | | LINK | |
KEY WORDS		ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT

Descriptors

Armed Forces (United States) - Expertise
Army Personnel - Expertise
Attitude Surveys - Korea
Attitude Surveys - Officer Personnel
Attitudes - Korea
Judgment - Officer Personnel
Officer Personnel - Expertise
Opinions - Korea

Open Ended Terms

Experts - Selection

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